

1918—



—1945

Entered as 2nd class matter

ALFRED UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXIV, No. 22

MARCH 16, 1945

RESISTANCE MOVEMENT FIGHTS JAPANESE RULE IN INDO-CHINA

TOKYO'S latest move in Indo-China, abolishing the puppet French régime of Vice Admiral Jean Decoux, is an attempt to strengthen the Japanese hold on this colony in preparation for an Allied invasion. The Japanese action, which took place on March 10, when Governor-General Decoux and the commanders of Indo-China's army, navy, and air forces were placed in protective custody, has been followed by local resistance of French troops in various parts of the country.

DECOUX'S SHIFTING STRATEGY. Japan's relations with Decoux and his followers—holdovers from the days of Vichy France—form a complicated story of pressure and maneuver, in which there are two constant themes: the desire of the Japanese to use their French puppets for all they were worth, and the concern of Decoux to be on the winning side in the war—whichever side that might be. Decoux followed a course of yielding to the Japanese the resources and facilities in which they were interested, while seeking to retain as much as possible of the structure of the French administration. The depths of his collaboration were reached in the period immediately after Pearl Harbor, when he called on the populations of the French Pacific islands—bases then vital to the maintenance of the Allied position in the Pacific—to revolt against the Free French authorities.

But by the summer of 1943, when the tide of the world struggle had already begun to turn, his strategy changed to one of using the growth of Allied military power to assert a degree of independence of the Japanese, at the same time that he sought to bolster his personal position. Later, with the liberation of France, his policy underwent a further evolution, and on September 26, 1944 he declared the allegiance of the colony "to eternal France. Peace," he said, "will find the mother country strong-

er than ever, and Indo-China linked with France's destiny more closely than before."

After Decoux was arrested, the Japanese radio charged that French officials had cooperated secretly with the United States air forces in the Philippines, China and India, "as well as with enemy submarines," and that United States planes had been permitted to deliver supplies at a landing field in northern Indo-China between February 20 and 22. Tokyo also declared that at a conference on February 20 many French military leaders "were known to have strongly advocated immediate launching of an armed attack on Japan." It is impossible to know whether these details contain any truth, but there is nothing inherently improbable in the idea that some French leaders may have considered the time ripe to break with the Japanese, or that United Nations military authorities had established contact with Decoux or lesser officials.

NATIONALISTS WAGE RESISTANCE: One factor that influenced Decoux in his efforts to maintain a certain reserve toward the Japanese was the spirit of resistance among the Indo-Chinese nationalists, as well as among some of the French residents of the colony. It was only natural that when the Japanese threw Decoux aside, after reaching the conclusion that he could no longer serve their purposes, they also sought to appeal directly to the nationalism of the Annamites, who constitute over 70 per cent of the population of Indo-China. On March 11, in a move that Tokyo had been considering at least since the summer of 1944, the "empire" of Annam, under its ruler, Bao Dai, declared its "independence" of the Government-General of Indo-China. By staging this new puppet show the Japanese hope to secure something far more important than the wavering Decoux could offer: the support of significant sections of the native population.

Contents of this BULLETIN may be reprinted with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.

Although the Japanese may achieve some success in this objective, the grant of a false independence is unlikely to influence the active nationalist movement, which has been anti-Japanese ever since 1940. Three insurrections against the invader, in October and November 1940 and January 1941, were followed by the organization of the League for the Independence of Indo-China in the latter year. The League's efforts, according to its program, are "entirely oriented towards the armed offensive with the object of freeing Indo-China from the Japanese invader." Claiming that "hundreds of thousands of men are organized and are ready to fight" under its direction, this Far Eastern resistance movement some time ago appealed for United Nations aid. The League offered in return to furnish information about the Japanese Army and French and Indo-Chinese Quislings; to cooperate with the Allied forces in various ways; and to "tell the Indo-Chinese people to welcome the Allied armies and to give all help when needed."

The anti-Japanese program of the League for the Independence of Indo-China is coupled with plans for the establishment of a free Indo-China after the defeat of Japan. This raises questions concerning the future relations of native nationalists and the de Gaulle government in Paris, as well as the role envisaged for the resistance movement in the operations of Allied forces invading Indo-China. De Gaulle and other French spokesmen have made it clear that France desires to participate fully in the Far Eastern war, especially in Indo-China's liberation from the Japanese. They have also pledged a new political status for Indo-China within a French imperial federation. Whether this will satisfy nationalist aspirations remains to be seen. But it is apparent that in Asia, as in Europe, liberation from the enemy will be accompanied by a host of problems, originating in the pre-war decades, but stimulated by experiences under the heel of the Axis conqueror.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

UNFINISHED BUSINESS AWAITS SAN FRANCISCO MEETING

If any of us had assumed that, because of the universal lip-service paid to international organization, the job half-finished in 1919 would be completed with relative ease in 1945, then the barrage of criticism directed against the results of Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta should serve to dispel that optimistic assumption. This criticism will reach a climax between now and the San Francisco Conference. It centers primarily on five points, all of which deserve frank discussion: (1) the relative powers of the Security Council and the General Assembly; (2) the procedure of voting in the Security Council; (3) the failure of the sponsoring Big Four—the United States, Britain, Russia and China—to include Poland in the list of invitations; (4) the position of France; and (5) the relationship of regional security arrangements to the United Nations organization.

COUNCIL VS. ASSEMBLY. So far as can be ascertained from available information concerning objections already raised to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals by small nations of Europe and Latin America, there is a strong desire that the General Assembly, in which small nations are to be represented on an equal basis with the great powers, should be given authority over matters of security, now reserved to the Security Council. The Big Three have answered this request with two principal contentions: that the great powers, which are to be permanent members of the Security Council, will have to carry the main military and economic burden of assuring world security; and that division of responsibility for security measures between the Council and the Assembly would result in dead-

locks, and failure to act promptly against an aggressor. It was with a view to providing for prompt and effective action in case of emergency that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals concentrated responsibility and authority in the small Security Council, leaving to the General Assembly administration over non-military matters. It is interesting to note that some of the people who criticized the League of Nations for its inability to check aggression are now alarmed by efforts to endow the United Nations organization with the substance of power.

A GREAT-POWER DICTATORSHIP? The Yalta compromise on voting procedure in the Security Council has particularly aroused the opposition of those who fear that, the stronger the Council, the more difficult it will prove for the United Nations to check any one of the great powers that may go on the rampage. This fear is linked with the belief that Russia was particularly insistent on retaining the right to veto any military action that the United Nations organization might want to take against it; and the statement has been repeatedly made that at Yalta President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill "gave in" to Stalin on this point. If past experience is any guide, however, it is difficult to believe that any international charter which did not assure the United States the right to veto the use of force against this country could have received the approval of the Senate.

No responsible person, least of all President Roosevelt, pretends that the Yalta arrangement on voting procedure is more than a compromise. It does have the advantage of enabling all nations to air their grievances against the great powers, even

though the final decision about the use of force will require the consent of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The hope is that, as time goes on, the free play of public opinion in all the United Nations, and the slow accumulation of experience in settling international conflicts by peaceful means, will gradually reduce friction and mutual fear to a point where the great powers can consider, with a measure of detachment, the complaints directed against them by the small nations.

WILL POLAND BE AT SAN FRANCISCO?

It is nothing short of tragic that, at the historic moment when the United Nations are being summoned to convert their wartime coalition into a peacetime organization, the one nation missing from the roll-call is Poland, whose invasion by Germany in 1939 precipitated war in Europe, and whose citizens have heroically resisted Hitler both at home, in the underground movement, and abroad, in the ranks of the Allies. Perhaps, given more time, the showdown foreshadowed by the Yalta Conference could have been avoided. But the two main problems of Poland—the territorial settlement, and the character of the government—have been under active discussion for over a year. To help find some middle ground on which Poles of diverse opinion, both at home and in exile, can meet to reconstruct their nation is the task the Big Three set themselves at Yalta. It is to their interest to succeed in this task, and thus prove that their hopes for orderly reconstruction of Europe are justified. Because of this it may be expected that every effort will be made to speed the foundation of a Polish government representing as many groups as possible, and that Poland will not be absent from San Francisco.

What will United Nations delegates discuss at the historical April 25 meeting? Read

AFTER VICTORY . . .

by Vera Micheles Dean

A clear, brief survey of world organization in question and answer form. Cuts through the mass of technical information now being published. Includes text of Dumbarton Oaks agreement.

25¢

Order from

Foreign Policy Association, 22 E. 38th St., New York 16

REGIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. Of even greater importance is the problem raised by France's decision not to join the Big Four in sponsoring the San Francisco Conference. The French are understandably sensitive about any measure that may seem to diminish the prestige of their country; and through a long series of inadvertences the United States, which cherishes profound admiration for the French people, has created the unfortunate impression that it has little patience with General de Gaulle. Yet the very fact that de Gaulle, unburdened by pre-war commitments and pre-war ties, received relatively little support from Washington places him in a position of independence which may make it possible for France to act as spokesman for small nations at San Francisco.

France will not be able to exercise leadership, however, if it persists in the attitude that determined its decision to abstain from sponsoring the San Francisco gathering. For General de Gaulle it was a great blow to discover that Stalin preferred to subordinate the Franco-Russian alliance to the United Nations organization. Yet it is obvious that if the United Nations organization is to function at all, all regional security arrangements and bilateral alliances must be placed within its framework—otherwise it will be doomed to failure from the outset. Stalin, so far as one can judge, recognized this, and to this extent went half-way to meet the wishes of this country, which had expressed fears about the "power politics" and "unilateral decisions" of Britain and Russia. Under the circumstances it must be hoped that the United States, in turn, will dispel the impression created abroad that, by the Act of Chapultepec, the Americas have established a regional system of security that could defy or ignore decisions of the United Nations organization about the Western Hemisphere.

The closer we come to San Francisco, the more we see that we have reached only the first stage of a long journey: we have recognized the need for an effective international organization that would be more than a debating society. Now we have to translate our desire for an international organization into concrete measures that can enlist the voluntary support of nearly fifty nations; as well as our own people. The real work has just begun.


VERA MICHELES DEAN

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN, Vol. XXIV, No. 22, MARCH 16, 1945. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. FRANK ROSS MCCOY, *President*; DOROTHY F. LEFT, *Secretary*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Three Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Five Dollars a Year

Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.

Washington News Letter



U.S. WEIGHS MILITARY EFFECT OF CHINESE DISUNITY

After examining the question of whether a greater bluntness in policy on our part would close the division between the central government of China in Chungking and the leaders in the Communist provinces in the northwest and the occupied areas, the United States government has decided against intervention, at least for the time being. The serious inquiry on this matter accounts, in part, for the presence in Washington of General Hurley, U.S. Ambassador to China, and Lieutenant General Wedemeyer, American Commander in China.

DELICATE, SERIOUS PROBLEM. This country has consistently shown a formal correctness in its relations with the legitimate government in China, headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. To promote unity, the United States has gone no further than to tender its good offices; it has used persuasion but has not sought to force the issue. Late in January Ambassador Hurley, acting as go-between, arranged negotiations between the Communists and the central government, but lacked any authority for requiring the two groups to settle their differences. The negotiations failed, and today Chungking and Yenan are still far removed from understanding.

Although the United States' diplomatic correctness obviously has not brought realization of our hopes for Chinese unity, it is difficult to tell whether abandonment of that correctness would cause improvement. Intervention to force Chungking to make concessions acceptable to the Communists might reduce Chiang Kai-shek's influence over the part of China now under central government control. Chungking has taken a number of steps toward solidifying central unity and impressing the outside world with its democratic disposition, and on March 1 Chiang Kai-shek announced that a National Assembly would convene on November 12 with all parties represented. But the Communists have charged that, without free elections, the constitutional convention will be a powerless body subservient to the present regime.

The war provides the United States with precedents for intervention in the affairs of an ally in the case of Yugoslavia, Poland and Greece. And the United States has an instrument for intervention in its control of shipments of arms and other war goods into China. As part of the policy of correctness, the United States has made arms available only to Chinese forces responsible to Chiang Kai-shek. On

February 15 General Wedemeyer said in Chungking that all United States officers in China are required to sign a statement that they will not give assistance to individuals or organizations other than those affiliated with the central government. Under a different policy the United States could share some arms with the Communists, whose Eighth Route and New Fourth armies, although poorly supplied, conduct a fairly efficient warfare against the Japanese. The Communist radio in Yenan reported on March 8 that during 1944 one unit of the Communist armies "operating north of Peiping broke into or captured 51 Japanese and puppet strongpoints and blockhouses in 234 engagements fought." According to a *New York Times* report of March 10, the Communists, who depend largely on captured Japanese equipment, have asked the United States to make available to them Japanese arms and munitions seized by American forces.

PROBLEM OF SEPARATE ARMIES. A policy of supplying the Communists is opposed by the central government, with whom the Communist negotiators discussed the question of separate armies during the February conversations. The government announced that it would approve the establishment of a committee of three, which would consider reorganization of the Communist armies and the question of their supplies, with government and Communist representatives on the committee having equal status. The possibility that an American Army officer would preside over this committee was suggested. However, General Chou En-lai, the Communist negotiator, said on February 15 that the object of the Chungking proposal was to place the Communist troops under Kuomintang officers. The Communists indicate that they are unwilling to relinquish their own army until the Chungking government becomes democratic. Their sincerity in this attitude will go untested so long as one-party government continues.

The disunity in China is a problem of war, not ideologies, for the United States. The great Chinese political division makes impossible a reasonably efficient prosecution of the war against Japan on Chinese territory, and its continuation might aid the Japanese in the event of an Allied landing in China. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander of the Pacific Fleet, hinted on March 8 that a China coast landing would precede the invasion of Japan. Such a development would seriously strain a divided China.

BLAIR BOLLES

FOR VICTORY • BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED